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Emily J. Brearley
 
1. What is Social Protection?
1 The welfare state, or social protection system, is one of the most important functions of
government. It redistributes wealth within capitalist systems that are prone to market
failure and an unequal distribution of assets. The welfare state also influences long-term
prospects for economic growth and poverty reduction through investments in human
capital.1The welfare state also bolsters democracy by legitimizing the political system.2 In
this  sense,  the  welfare  state  can be  seen as  those  policies  that  constitute  the  ‘social
contract’— an often implicit agreement between government and citizens that defines
basic social and economic protections that the government is obliged to provide; and, the
responsibilities of citizens who expect to receive these rights.3Indeed the right to social
protection is enshrined in the constitutions and laws of most Latin American countries.
2 Social  protection  policies  can  be  defined  as  the  sum of  two  types  of  policies:  social
assistance and  social  insurance.4Social  insurance  policies  are  used  by  governments  to
correct  insurance  market  failures,  and  ensure  consumption  smoothing;  they  usually
consist  of  pensions  and  unemployment  insurance.  Social  assistance  aims  to  reduce
poverty and address equity issues,  these programs include conditional  cash transfers
(CCTs).  In Latin America,  social  insurance is  predominantly the reserve of citizens in
formal  employment,  while  those  in  the  informal  sector  must  make  do  with  social
assistance.  There  is  an  explicit  understanding  that  social  insurance  policies  are
preferable,  since  they  offer  protection  and  planning  against  life’s  vicissitudes  and
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inevitable old age. Social assistance policies are akin to a sticking plaster, bestow a lesser
monetary value, and merely try to ameliorate the circumstances of those already in dire
straits.
3 There is a great deal of diversity within the Latin America region in terms of social policy.
The most economically advanced countries such as Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica spend
about  as  much as  Spain on social  protection,  whereas  the poorest  countries  such as
Guatemala and Paraguay spend about the same amount as the Philippines or Indonesia. F5
That said, one of the defining characteristics of the Latin American labor market is the
high  level  of  informality.  Though often  not the  largest  sector  in  terms  of  GDP,  the
informal sector often employs the majority of the labor force in the region. Many scholars
believe that informal workers are more vulnerable than formal workers—they lack legal
protection, benefits such as social insurance, and the right to union organization.6 Others
claim that formal jobs are not necessarily better than informal jobs, and that workers
often shift between the two sectors. However, informality seems to affect productivity in
both sectors, and impedes economic growth.7 
 
2. The Origins of Latin America’s Truncated Welfare
State
4 For as long as data has been collected on living standards, Latin America has ranked as
the most unequal region in the world. Although social protection systems developed as
early as the 1920s in the region, the Latin American welfare state has historically failed to
address the region’s high levels of poverty and inequality.8 By the early 19thcentury, the
Latin American colonies had fought for, and won independence from Europe. Yet the
independence  movement  was  essentially  an  elite  undertaking  designed  to  protect
established privilege, rather than transform the structure of society or rewrite the social
contract and share wealth.9 
5 Post revolution, and in the absence of the unifying glue of the Castilian crown, the State
looked to military strongmen to act as a stabilizing force after the economic depression
and chaos that followed independence. The militarization of society created a political
elite  that  treated  politics  as  a  form  of  economic  enterprise;  geared  not  towards
governance,  but  the  capture  of  public  funds  to  offer  patronage  and build  up  power
networks.10 By the eve of the Mexican revolution in 1910, only 2.4 percent of household
heads in rural Mexico owned land, whereas this figure was 75 percent in North America,
due to policies such as the Homestead Act of 1872 which distributed free land.11 
6 Despite the huge progress wrought by the first globalization boom in the late 19th century
—streets were paved and lit, railways were built, urban life expanded apace—there was
surprisingly little change to the structure of Latin American society, and therefore the
opportunities for material progress for the majority of citizens. Economic growth was
based  entirely  on  raw  materials,  which  ultimately  meant  a  continuance  in  the
exploitation of  the  traditional  rural  sector.  Thus  during  the  last  quarter  of  the  19th
Century,  no  bourgeois  revolution  had  actually  occurred.  The  hacienda and  its  vast
landholdings dominated the economy and the servile rural labor force. Politics remained
based on patronage, and the Latin American state remained essentially weak.12 With little
incentive to revolutionize technology or innovate, the region fell far behind its northern
neighbours. 
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7 Though social structures had not radically shifted, new groups which formed as a result
of globalization and increased urbanization were able to push for the creation of albeit
narrow social protection systems. Inspired by Bismarck’s innovations, the nascent Latin
American welfare state consisted solely of social insurance, contingent on labor status.13
Southern  Cone  countries—Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile  and  Uruguay—were  the  first  to
introduce insurance schemes in the early 1920s for urban elites such as civil servants,
public enterprise employees, the military, and private sector workers. These occupational
plans  offered  disability  pensions,  survivorships,  old-age  pensions  and  in  some  cases
health insurance.14 
8 During the Great Depression, Latin America experienced a precipitous drop in demand
from its traditional markets in Europe. This prompted states to reexamine the dangers of
laissez-faire  economic  policy,  in  favor  of  import-substitution-industrialization  (ISI).15
After World War II,  ISI  policies really took off,  and states created an inward-looking
economic model that relied on infant industry promotion and domestic demand to spur
growth. ISI worked well for Latin American countries, and in the 1940s and 1950s, the
region saw healthy growth rates, with industry outpacing overall economic growth. The
ISI  period proved to  be  an important  critical  juncture  in  terms of  social  protection.
Between the 1940s to the 1970s, the welfare state underwent its greatest expansion, as
urban-based reformists challenged the agro-export oligarchies that had dominated Latin
American politics.16 This challenge came from a relatively wide cross-section of groups
from the middle and upper classes, military officers and even dissident factions in the
oligarchy itself. Political leaders also began to pursue and co-opt the newly urbanized and
unionized working classes.17 
9 ISI  was  a  system  that  shielded  domestic  industry  and  created  conditions  for  the
emergence of a critical mass of urban workers who gained the capacity to act collectively,
and to demand social programs from the government.18 This connection between closed
economies and the development of the welfare state is the opposite of what occured in
Europe, where, at the close of WWII, trade openness presaged the development of the
universal  welfare  state  as  a  compensation mechanism,  to  protect  workers  who were
increasingly exposed to the vagaries of international markets. The scope and role of the
growing  welfare  state  differed  among  countries.  In  the  1940s,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela widened the availability of social insurance to a
larger  part  of  the formal labor  force, 19 with Central  America and the Caribbean only
following in the mid-1950s and 1960s.20 Though all welfare systems in the region had an
urban-bias, some were more ‘advanced’ than others. Here the type and longevity of regime
seems to have been significant. In long-standing democracies such as Argentina, Brazil,
Chile,  Costa  Rica  and Uruguay,  the  expansion of  the franchise  and growth in  social
entitlements played an important role.21 Meanwhile dictatorships were more inclined to
maintain the status quo.22
10 It was not only group pressure that forced governments’ hands, but also a simultaneous
movement by the state to preemptively enact top-down social policies as a mechanism to
control or co-opt the urban lower and middle classes.23 By giving preferential treatment,
governments were able to consolidate divisions between different groups and prevent a
united popular movement that would challenge state power. Therefore social security
coverage  started  with  the  military,  civil  servants,  and  the  judiciary  and  was  later
extended to the liberal professions and workers in the most organized and strategically
located sectors. With the partial exceptions of Mexico and Venezuela, the expansion of
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the welfare state did not extend to the countryside. Here elites maintained their grip on
power, and eventually established patronage-based ‘clientelistic’ electoral machines. This
‘labor-market dualism’ 24 meant that there was little solidarity between urban white and
blue-collar workers and the rural poor. 
11 Throughout the ISI period, Latin American governments also used subsidies on goods and
services as the principal mechanism for social assistance. There were two main types of
food-based programs: one that targeted poor households specifically, and another which
focused  on  select  demographic  groups  such  as  school  children.  The  effectiveness  of
Mexico’s milk and tortilla subsidies are illustrative of these instruments in general. These
policies were poorly targeted; regressive in that non-poor also benefitted alongside the
neediest; and, they also created price distortions.4F25 
12 In  Latin  America  democracy  and  industrialization  did  not  therefore  emerge
simultaneously. Thus when pressures for redistribution could not be met through the
political aggregation of interests, governments turned to the tried and tested draconian
measures  of  the  caudillos  to  keep  the  peace.  Urbanization  then,  created  a  lethally
destabilizing force.  Thus ISI  was  accompanied by increasingly authoritarian forms of
government. This marked the ultimate failure of the Latin American welfare state to work
—to  be  progressive,  inclusive  and  democratic.  Unable  to  cope  with  the  clamor  for
enfranchisement from the urban proletariat,  elites sought to protect their power and
clamped down on dissent. Cleavages between the export sector and protected domestic
industry, between capital and labor, and between white and non-white deepened to the
point  where  any  possibility  of  a  consensual  social  contract  evaporated.26 From  the
mid-1960s, virtually all advanced Latin American states underwent periods of internal
war and military despotism.27 
13 However, merely stifling dissent did not make it disappear, nor by the early 1980s had the
military brass managed to transform Latin America’s economies as promised.  The ISI
model had run out of steam and money. The collapse of the political status quo presaged a
period of democratic transition across the region37F28 
14 To respond to new democratic social demands and short-circuit social movements fueled
by  hunger  and  discontent,  Latin  American  governments  introduced  social  assistance
policies for the first time, such as in-kind transfers, social funds, and workfare programs.
An important innovation in social assistance policy at this time was the introduction of
social investment funds (SIFs). Once as trendy as CCTs, SIFs were designed to ameliorate the
effect  of  stringent  economic  adjustment  programs,  by  generating  employment
opportunities for the poorest. The funds typically involved mopping up excess labor to
work on an array of small infrastructure projects.29 Though SIFs were well targeted to the
poor,F they were vulnerable to political manipulationand clientelism.30 Emblematic of this
problem  was  Peru’s  Foncodes program,  which  gave  politicians  and  bureaucrats  wide
discretion to choose which communities to help,31 while Mexico’s Pronasol was equally
prone to  use  by  the  PRI  government  to  reward certain  constituencies.32 Guatemala’s
Fontierras used  government  subsidies  to  help  communities  buy  land  as  part  of  the
country’s Peace Accords. However, the explicit subsidy caused a hike in land prices, thus
saddling indigenous communities with unserviceable debt.33 The development of social
assistance programs can therefore be seen as another instance of elite co-option of newly
enfranchised masses, much the same as had occurred in the first period of globalization.34
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3. Financial Crisis and the Advent of CCTs
15 The  breakthrough  in  social  assistance  policy  was  heralded  not  by  democratic
transformation, but fiscal crisis that required governments to do more with less, and to
prevent social upheaval. Between 1980 and 1998, Latin America experienced more than
forty episodes of currency crisis, during which GDP fell by four percent or more.35 In 1980,
120 million Latin Americans lived in poverty,  but by 1985 the number had grown to
around 170 million. Were it not for illegal drug exports, immigration, and the informal
economy, the outcome could have been far worse.36 
16 The new mantra was small  government and free markets,  policies enshrined in the ‘
Washington  Consensus’.37 Essentially  this  was  a  prescription for  two types  of  policy—a
simultaneous shrinking of the state and opening up of the economy. Fiscal constraints
strengthened the hands of the technocrats, who were able to implement liberal reforms
to limit social spending, which dropped in most countries to about seventy percent of
pre-crisis levels.38 Ten Latin American countries undertook structural pension reforms
which wholly or partially substituted the public system with a private one,39 and pension
coverage as a whole dropped in eleven countries.40 Countries facing less severe economic
conditions were generally more cautious in introducing liberal reforms, and could better
maintain broad-based welfare systems. For example, pension privatization initiatives in
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay preserved a large role for the government. Costa Rica
went further to ameliorate the economic pain, and its more moderate structural reform
was accompanied by employment creation schemes, and a strengthening of healthcare
and social assistance for marginalized groups.F41
17 It was in Mexico, where the tequila crisis in 1994 couple with a Zapatista revolt, pushed
governments  to  think creatively about  social  protection.  On January 1st,  1994,  a  CCT
program was first introduced, based on pilots in Brazil. The Progresa program then went
nationwide in 1997. According to Santiago Levy, the former deputy finance minister and
‘godfather’ of Progresa/ Oportunidades, the resistance from entrenched interests linked to
food subsidies, was strong: “it helped that we were working under severe budget constraints—
we had to do things more efficiently. When you don’t have much money, the hand of the Finance
Ministry is strengthened.”42Levy also employed a strategy of incremental cuts to remove
tortilla and milk subsidies to avoid a showdown and pay for the new CCT program. “In the
end I removed the subsidy by stealth. I cut the quantity and the price subsidy little by little; it took
about two years to do, from 1996-1997. We sold all the infrastructure and closed down the factories.
Although I was never able to close the milk racket completely as I ran out of time”. F43 To date,
Oportunidades has helped a quarter of Mexico’s population of 100 million gain access to
nutrition, health and education services.
18 The dramatic failure of free markets to bring about sustained growth, or reduce poverty
and inequality,  led to a slow reappraisal of previous policy prescriptions. In 2005 the
World Bank issued a mea culpa, admitting: 
“At the start of the 1990s, economists thought the road ahead was clear…(but) the
results  of  these  reforms  were  unexpected.  They  exceeded  the  most  optimistic
forecasts in some cases and fell well short of expectations in others. At the same
time, booms and busts continued in Latin America…Sustained growth depends on
key  functions  that  need  to  be  fulfilled  overtime:  accumulation  of  physical  and
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human capital, efficiency in the allocation of resources, adoption of technology, and
the sharing of the benefits of growth.”166F44 
19 One  of  the  consequences  of  the  painful  social  upheavals  that  occurred  during  the
financial crises was a new respect for the political and social benefits of adequate social
policy.  45In  effect,  aquiet  revolution unfolded,  as  governments  sought  to  reduce  high
poverty  rates  by  extending  the  role  of  the  welfare  state  with  the  creation  a  new
generation  of  social  assistance  programs.46 Conditional  cash  transfers  are  widely
perceived to be the most successful  of  these new policies,  and now exist  in 16 Latin
American countries in total, benefitting an estimated 22 million households—16 percent
of the region’s population.47 
 
4. What is So Great About CCTs?
20 For many development specialists the most revolutionary aspect of CCTs is the fact that
they have done a far superior job at targeting the poor than previous social assistance
programs.48 CCTs  replaced targeted or  generalized food subsidies,  often delivered by
intermediaries, with direct cash in hand. Beneficiaries themselves decide how to spend
the money, rather than the government. The cash transfer is conditional on specific and
measurable  patterns  of  behavior  by  beneficiaries,  such  as  ensuring  children  attend
school, or visit a health clinic.49 Payments are given to the female head of a household,
due to quantitative evidence that shows that women are more likely to use extra income
productively—to help their family and themselves. CCTs aim to alleviate poverty in the
short-term, through the redistribution of wealth, and in the long-term, by building up
human capital among the poor through improved education, health and nutrition.50
21 CCTs have entailed a modest shift in resources away from traditional social assistance
programs.  On average CCTs  account  for  around 0.25  percent  of  GDP,  and cover  16.9
percent  of  Latin  America’s  poorest  families.  There  are  significant  differences  across
countries in terms of expenditure, with 0.1 percent of GDP spent in Chile and Peru, 0.2
percent in Colombia, and 0.6 percent in Ecuador.51 Coverage in El Salvador is 1.5 percent
of the population, and up to 54 percent of the population in Bolivia. Although they are
not expensive, efficient targeting to the extreme poor means that CCTs are able to reach
those most in need. CCTs have had a wider impact than on social assistance alone, and
have rationalized the social protection infrastructure as a whole, by helping to rationalize
and integrate social assistance programs. This was especially the case in Brazil, where
Bolsa Família consolidated four other programs—Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Cartão
Alimentação, and Auxílio Gás, under the centralized CCT program.
22 CCT programs have increased household consumption, and reduced poverty.52 There is
also  a  strong  link  between  the  introduction  of  CCTs  and  reductions  in  inequality. F53
According to the Fundaçao Getulio Vargas, CCTs in Brazil helped reduce the Gini index
(that measures inequality) from 0.58 to 0.54 from 2003 to 2008. F54
23 In terms of education and health outcomes, CCTs have led to significant increases in the
use of services. Virtually every program has found a positive effect on school enrollment
and  a  reduction  in  drop-out  rates,  including  programs  in  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico and Nicaragua.55 However, there is less evidence that final
attainment rates have improved. The story is similar in terms of health, and we see that
CCTs have had a positive effect on the use of services—the take-up of vaccinations and
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visits  to  health  centers  for  consultations  for  example.  CCTs  have  also  achieved
improvement in a number of other key health indicators.56 Final outcomes, again, are more
modest however. CCTs must be put in their proper context therefore: they are great a
reducing extreme poverty in the short run, but in the long run, health and education
services must improve. 
24 Some scholars claim that CCTs reduce clientelism through the systematic use of modern
targeting and implementation techniques. Conditioning the transfers on “good behavior”
may also be perceived as less paternalistic than the alternative of conditioning transfers
on say, voting for a certain party or belonging to a required social organization. F57 In
short, CCTs do not require political brokers, and receipt of benefits is not conditional on
political  loyalty.58 Moreover,  systematic  evaluations provide empirical  evidence about
CCT program performance and results.59What happens when CCTs are used by politicians
for electoral  means? but CCTs supposedly constitute vote buying of  the ‘good’  sort. F60
 Voters that supported President Lula thanks to Bolsa Familia were simply acting in a
rational manner;61Thus politicians derive rewards or punishments from the electorate,
based on their record of providing services.62
25 Other scholars argue that CCTs are an example of a more exclusive clientelistic linkage, or
a type “new caudillismo”, whereby a select group of politicians benefit from the spoils of
state-funded largesse.63 Santiago Levy laments the fact that CCTs have often not become
properly established within line ministries, or under law, and are therefore vulnerable to
changing political winds.64
26 Some scholars argue that the conditional aspect of CCTs has managed to improve the social
contract, since the State is seen as a partner in the process, rather than a nanny. F65In
effect, the Left like CCTs because they are a restatement of citizen’s rights, and embrace
the ideology of  redistribution;  whereas the Right like CCTs because they represent a
contract that avoids passive dependency. Others find the very idea of conditionalities
objectionable, since it presupposes that the government knows better than citizens how
best to use their time.66 After all, the recipients of state pensions have not been required
to comply with any conditionalities with regards to their children’s health or schooling.
 
5. Reverse Robin-Hood: Latin America’s Welfare State
Today
27 For all the success of CCTs, they have not managed to change the essential paradigm of
 Latin American social protection systems, which remain two-tier nature: the rich and
poor have access to separate benefits that differ greatly in quality. The benefits offered by
expanded social assistance programs such as CCTs are often markedly inferior to those
afforded by traditional insurance programs;  programs that still  only cover about one
third of the labor force in most countries.67 
28 This lack of coverage can be blamed on the inherent design features of Latin American
welfare states that were modeled along European lines. These systems were based on the
presumption that  as  an economy develops,  the majority of  the labor force would be
absorbed into the formal economy. Yet far from declining, informality has risen in recent
decades,  and  today  ranges  between  one  and  two  thirds  of  the  economically  active
working population in the region.68
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29 Still,  too  little  revenue  comes  from  income  or  land  taxation,  and  too  much  from
regressive,  indirect or value-added taxes.69 Once nominally financed by contributions,
most social insurance programs are now funded more or less directly by taxes.The social
insurance system therefore fosters a ‘reverse Robin Hood effect’,  by which the poor are
made to pay for the benefit of the rich. Those in the top quintile of the population receive
about 60 percent of net social insurance transfers. It is the poorest, often-rural workers,
who have the lowest  coverage rates.  Even in Brazil,  Chile,  Costa Rica and Uruguay—
relatively well-covered countries—coverage rates are still  much lower for the bottom
quintile of  the labor force.70 In Brazil,  while almost 70 percent of  the top quintile is
covered by contributory old-age pensions,  only 20 percent  of  the poorest  fifth are.71
Moreover,  the  poor  quality  of  education  and  health  care  undermines  upward  social
mobility. 
30 In terms of social expenditure across the globe, Latin America only spends more than
South  Asia  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa  in  total.  However,  once  the  split  between  social
insurance and social assistance is taken into account, Latin America spends less on social
assistance relative to most other regions of the world.72 In many countries in the region,
income tax is not sufficient to finance contributory social insurance systems, and thus
these  pensions,  unemployment  benefits  and  health  insurance  schemes  are  running
deficits,  which must be financed from taxes on current and future generations. F73 Net
pension subsidies absorb around 5 percent of GDP in the region—higher than spending on
social  assistance,  and  average  spending  on  education  and  health  combined.74 Social
assistance is financed out of general revenues and subsidies to informal sector workers.
Given that Latin America has one of the lowest direct tax intakes in the world—at around
15  percent  of  GDP—these  schemes  are  an  added  strain  on  public  finances.  Non-
contributory SI schemes (NCSI) have failed to significantly extended pension coverage to
a  broader  segment  of  society,  or  put  social  insurance on a  more fiscally  sustainable
trajectory. 75 Only a minority of workers have access to unemployment insurance, with
just below 0.2 percent of workers in Colombia, 0.22 percent in Chile and 1.0 percent of
employed workers  in  Brazil  with  unemployment  insurance  savings  accounts.76 Social
insurance  still remains  a  two-track  system,  and  demands  from  select  groups  have
managed to maintain superior benefits for the few.77 
31 While expenditure on social insurance hardly benefits the poor, by contrast spending on
health  and  education  constitutes  about  75  percent  of  the  total  social  expenditures
received by families  in the lowest  quintile,  and has a  positive impact  on the overall
distribution of income.78 Yet poor quality continues to plague both health and education
systems in the Latin America, as the middle classes flee from public to private schools and
health insurance, sharply curtailing their interest in improving these services for the
majority of  citizens.  Even in countries  with near-universal  protection,  there are vast
differences between geographical zones. Costa Rica and Cuba—the only countries with
integrated  systems,  along  with  Brazil,  exhibit  the  least  variation  in  standards.79
Worryingly, health and education standards in other developing regions, especially Asia,
have generally improved at a faster rate, and Latin America has fallen behind.80 
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6. A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the
Growth of the Welfare State
32 The discussion above can be summarized by a simple typology that links the expansion of
the social contract, and inclusive, social insurance coverage for all.  In this conception,
governments progressively replace clientelistic, and exclusive social protection policies
with  more  programmatic  and  inclusive  policy  making  (Figure  1.1  below).  In  this
simplified  world  the  ideal  is  to  improve  on  both  axes  simultaneously—for  example
programmatic  policy  making  without social  capital  would  look  something  like  South
Africa under apartheid. Starting in the 1970s Latin American societies began to throw off
military  rule  and  thus  social  capital  increased,  however  social  protection  policy,
especially social assistance, remained clientelistic.
33 Hence,  another  way  of  asking  whether  CCTs  have  changed  the  paradigm of  social
protection in Latin America; is to define whether CCTs have pushed the Latin American
welfare state somewhere along the line from point A towards point B. 
34 In light of the current evidence, CCTs help to keep hunger from the door, but those who
receive them are often excluded from social insurance, which still consumes the bulk of
social spending.  Moreover, the quality of health and education—the very services that
CCTs rely on to combat inter-generational poverty—vary widely between rich and poor
neighborhoods, urban and rural areas. We therefore note a shift along the line from A to
B. However, this movement might not be linear—backsliding could take place as middle
class Latin Americans question the cost of CCTs. 
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35 More worrying is the suggestion that CCTs will not allow a linear progression from point A
to point C (policy gets stuck at point B), and make elite-sponsored reform even more
difficult. This is because CCTs are so popular with recipients; many of whom received
little  or  nothing from the state before,  that  they might  staunch the kind of  ‘critical
juncture’  moments such as the Chiapas uprising,  thus denying the universal  right to
social protection enshrined in almost every Latin American constitution. Ironically the
success  of  CCTs  could  become  their  biggest  failure.  For  all  their  sophisticated
implementation  and  evaluation  mechanisms,  CCTs  will  ultimately  fail  if  they  cannot
change the paradigm of inter-generational poverty.
 
7. Conclusion
36 The inherent problem of the welfare system in Latin America is its two-track nature. For
Santiago Levy and many others,  the ideal  would be a uniform and universal  system.
Furthermore  Levy  believes  that  informality  is  the  key  stumbling  block  for  change.
Informality lowers the productivity of both formal and informal workers.  The tax on
salaried  labor  reduces  formal  employment,  and  the  subsidy  on  non-salaried  labor
increases  informal  employment.  Investment  is  therefore  distorted  in  favor  of  the
informal  sector,  where  productivity  of  labor  is  lower.  This  reduces  aggregate
productivity,  and  ultimately  GDP growth.81 Thus,  even  if  the  human capital  of  poor
workers is improved by CCT programs, their productivity in the labor market will not
increase and inter-generational poverty will continue to plague Latin America. The only
way to mend the social contract and provide social insurance for all citizens is to create
universal  entitlements for all  workers,  irrespective of whether their job is formal,  or
informal, and paid for out of the same source of revenue. This, indeed, would be a truly
paradigmatic shift in social policy. 
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ABSTRACTS
This paper reviews the development of  the Latin American welfare state since the conquest,
illustrating how initial factor endowments arrested the development of inclusive social policies.
With  industrialization  social  insurance  was  expanded  to  urban  working  and  middle  classes,
however, it took the debt crises of the 1980s, rather than democracy, to prompt the creation of
effective  social  assistance  policies  in  the  form  of  Conditional  Cash  Transfers  (CCTs).  Unlike
previous social assistance policies, CCTs are better targeted to the poor, and have succeeded in
increasing income while improving human development indicators.  They have not,  however,
changed the essential paradigm of the Latin American welfare state, which is still characterized
by a two-tier system: the rich have separate and better quality protection than the poor, as well
as access to better health and education services. Thus while CCTs are tranquilizers—some might
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even call them populism—they are not a cure for existing inequalities, and might even delay the
creation of a truly inclusive welfare state.
Cet  article  examine  le  développement  de  l'État-providence  en  Amérique  Latine  depuis  la
conquête, illustrant la façon dont les dotations en facteurs initiaux ont arrêté le développement
de politiques sociales inclusives. Avec l'industrialisation, l’assurance sociale a été étendue aux
classes défavorisées et en milieu urbain. Cependant, ce sont les crises de la dette des années 1980
– et non la démocratie - qui entraînèrent la création de politiques d'aide sociale efficaces sous la
forme de transferts monétaires conditionnés (TMC). Contrairement aux politiques antérieures de
l'aide sociale, les TMC ciblent mieux les pauvres, et ont réussi à augmenter les revenus tout en
améliorant les indicateurs de développement humain. Ces derniers ne sont toutefois pas parvenu
à modifier les fondements de l'État-providence en l'Amérique latine, qui se caractérise toujours
par un système à deux vitesses: les riches ont une protection distincte et de meilleure qualité que
les pauvres, ainsi que l'accès à de meilleurs services de santé et d'éducation. Ainsi, alors que CCTs
apaisent les tensions sociale, certains pourraient même les qualifier de populisme, ils ne sont pas
une solution pour les inégalités existantes ; ils pourraient même retarder la création d'un État-
providence réellement inclusif.
INDEX
Mots-clés: transfert monétaire conditionnel, protection sociale, assistance sociale, assurance
sociale, Amérique latine, réduction de la pauvreté
Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfers, Social Protection, Social Assistance, Social Insurance,
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